In this paper we develop a sticky price DSGE model to study the role of capital market imperfections for monetary policy implementation. Recent empirical and theoretical studies have stressed the e¤ect of …rms' external …nance on their pricing decisions. The so-called cost channel of the transmission mechanism has been explored within New Keynesian frameworks that pose particular emphasis on in ‡ation dynamics. These models generally disregard the role of external …nance for the dynamics of asset prices. We ask whether monetary policy should respond to deviations of asset prices from their frictionless level and, more importantly, if the answer to this question changes when …nancial frictions are properly taken into account. We analyze these issues from the vantage of equilibrium determinacy and stability under adaptive learning. We show that usual conditions for equilibrium uniqueness and E-stability are signi…cantly altered when the cost channel matters. Nevertheless, we …nd that responding to actual or expected asset price misalignments helps at restoring determinacy and stability under learning. These conclusions are further enforced in the presence of a high degree of pass-through from policy to bank lending rates.
Introduction
The last two decades have been marked by an increasing occurrence of …nancial instability episodes. These have often resulted in macroeconomic turmoil, both in industrialized economies and emerging markets. The signi…cance of real costs of …nancial instability emphasizes the need to explore the link between …nancial volatility and the real economy. Through its in ‡uence on the cost for external …nance, the banking sector plays a prominent role in the monetary policy transmission mechanism, determining the amplitude of monetary policy innovations on prices and on …rms' pro…tability. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to account for the e¤ects of bank lending on production, in ‡ation and asset prices. This leads to two central questions:
…rstly, should the monetary authority respond to asset prices to enhance …nancial stability and to rule out possible multiple equilibria? Secondly, does the answer to this question depend on whether …nancial frictions and the banking sector are properly taken into account?
We address these questions within a New Keynesian (NK) framework featuring the existence of a cost channel e¤ect, where …rms'marginal cost directly depends on the nominal rate of interest. In recent years, a growing body of cross-country evidence has stressed the relevance of the cost of external …nance for pricing decisions of …rms. The literature on the cost channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism has placed particular emphasis on the role of supplyside e¤ects for in ‡ation dynamics. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and Schabert (2006) explore the cost channel in a model with nominal rigidities. They show that the traditional output-in ‡ation trade-o¤ can be signi…cantly modi…ed, as the cost channel substantially alters the transmission of monetary policy. Despite the increasing emphasis placed on …nancial frictions as an ampli…cation mechanism of macroeconomic ‡uctuations (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989) , the e¤ect of the cost channel on …rms'pro…tability and on asset prices has generally been neglected by the literature exploring the normative aspects of monetary policy.
Supply-side e¤ects exerted by nominal interest rates can be interpreted as a direct consequence of capital market imperfections, namely asymmetric information giving rise to agency problems between …rms and lenders. The magnitude of monetary policy supply-side e¤ects not only relates to …rms'dependence on external funds but also on the pass-through from policy to bank lending rates. This aspect is central to our analysis. Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and Schabert (2006) show that heterogeneous …nancial systems can lead to major di¤erences in the transmission of policy shocks. In the perspective of designing the architecture of an optimal currency area, convergence of …nancial systems seems to be an important prerequisite for a successful common monetary policy. These considerations turn out to be particularly relevant for the European Monetary Union (EMU), where a single monetary authority in ‡uences heterogeneous credit markets.
The present work builds on the theoretical literature on fragility and instability fostered by imperfect …nancial markets. These studies have often produced models of interaction between …nancial and goods markets. As detailed in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 1993) , Gertler (1989, 1990) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , …nancing constraints can be relevant to both investment and production decisions. In our framework, …rms are committed to pay the wage bill before production takes place and pro…ts are realized. Although …rms could alternatively issue new equity, this possibility is a priori excluded. In fact, due to adverse selection phenomena, new equity issues would be too costly. Therefore, …rms have to resort to the credit market. Asymmetric information only characterizes the equity market, whereas the banking sector is assumed to have perfect information.
We study the performance of interest rate rules responding to (current or expected) in ‡ation, output gap and asset prices misalignments from their frictionless level when the cost channel matters. We tackle the problem from the vantage of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) uniqueness and stability under adaptive learning. As a matter of fact, Brückner and Schabert (2003) and Llosa and Tuesta (2007) show that the cost channel signi…cantly modi…es standard conditions for determinacy and learnability within the context of a NK model. However, they only consider a one-to-one relationship between the monetary instrument and the bank-lending rate.
This study considers the entire range of pass-through from policy to bank lending rates.
We provide an analytical assessment of the conditions for determinacy and E-stability under an interest rate rule that responds only to in ‡ation. In this case, we provide critical values of the degree of pass-through that signi…cantly alter the standard properties of the NK model in terms of equilibrium uniqueness and expectational stability. As it is well known, interest rate rules usually ensure a unique equilibrium if they ful…ll the so-called Taylor principle. We show that this condition is no longer su¢ cient to ensure determinacy when the cost channel matters, as we identify a set of stricter conditions that bound the response to the rate of in ‡ation from above. Given that the nominal rate of interest has a direct e¤ect on in ‡ation, these constraints prevent the central bank from being too reactive to in ‡ationary pressures. Moreover, we show that considering a one-to-one relationship from policy to bank lending rates, as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006) , can be quite misleading for the design of monetary policy. Conversely, a careful assessment of the degree of pass-through is necessary to understand the magnitude of supply-side e¤ects.
Numerical simulations show that the area of determinacy and E-stability considerably decreases in the degree of pass-through. We argue that, under strong credit market distortions, the monetary policy authority should be cautious when designing its policy. A response to either output gap or asset prices is desirable under these circumstances, as this reduces the area of indeterminacy and E-instability. When we compare the two alternatives we observe that in some cases a response to asset prices might be even more attractive than responding to the output gap, as a smaller reaction coe¢ cient is required to drive the system in the area of determinacy.
Moreover, under uncertainty regarding the degree of pass-through between policy and bank lending rates, we suggest that the central bank is better o¤ following a rule in which the policy instrument is set according to misalignments in contemporaneous data rather than adopting forward looking interest rate rules. In the former case a considerably wider area of determinacy and a lower welfare loss is achieved for a plausible range of responses to in ‡ation and output gap. Furthermore, responding to asset prices is always bene…cial, from a welfare point of view, when the central bank considers a term re ‡ecting stock price volatility in the loss function.
Our results point out that responding to asset prices misalignments might be bene…cial when strong credit market distortions are detected. This strategy generally allows us to ensure equilibrium uniqueness and learnability. Due to a direct e¤ect induced by interest rate movements on …rms' pro…tability, these results stand in contrast with previous studies exploring the opportunity to stabilize asset prices in the presence of nominal rigidities. As a matter of fact, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) show that the central bank can inadvertently introduce real indeterminacy into the economy by responding positively to asset prices misalignments. They suggest that this is due to the inverse relationship between marginal costs and dividends that classically arises in a sticky price environment. In our case, the interest rate directly a¤ects …rms'pro…tability and, in turn, asset prices. When the cost channel matters, the policy instrument a¤ects positively the marginal cost, hence a monetary innovation exerts a direct in ‡uence on in ‡ation dynamics in the same direction. At the same time, in ‡ationary pressures are scaled down if the central bank responds positively to asset prices, as this translates into a negative response to the output gap that balances the cost channel e¤ect.
The remainder of the paper reads as follows: Section 1 reviews some relevant literature; Section 2 introduces the theoretical setting; Section 3 draws some policy implications in a frictionless environment; Section 4 assesses the conditions for determinacy and E-stability under di¤erent interest rate rules; Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
In principle, the cost channel has been advanced as a possible explanation of a positive reaction of the price level to contractionary monetary policy observed in several empirical studies. Sims (1992) was the …rst to point out this unexpected …nding for the United States, readily labelled by Eichenbaum (1992) as the price puzzle. Numerous studies have focused on the role of the cost channel for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, both from an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Barth and Ramey (2000) provide evidence in support of the cost channel in industry-level longitudinal data, whereas Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) incorporate the cost channel into an aggregate structural model. Compared to previous studies that primarily focus on banks operating in a frictionless credit market (see, e.g., Ravenna and Walsh, 2006) , Hülsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershäuser (2006) assess the cost channel from a di¤erent perspective. They conjecture that banks determine their loan supply in light of expectations about the future course of monetary policy. This framework implies that the adjustment of loan rates to a monetary policy shock is sticky. Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and Schabert (2006) estimate di¤erent Phillips curves that account for direct interest rate e¤ects.
They show that changes in short-run nominal interest rates have a substantial direct e¤ect on in ‡ation dynamics in the majority of developed countries. Their structural model reveals that the cost channel can substantially dampen in ‡ation responses, and is even able to account for inverse in ‡ation reactions, which can be related to the price puzzle. Thus, their analysis points at signi…cant direct interest rate e¤ects on short-run in ‡ation dynamics, indicating that the cost channel is non-negligible for the assessment of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Nonetheless, the existing literature on the cost channel does not explore the e¤ect of …rms' reliance on external …nance on their pro…tability and, in turn, on stock price dynamics. Our paper addresses this issue and evaluates the opportunity for the monetary authority to respond to asset prices misalignments when the cost channel matters. A long-standing debate concerning the role and scope of central banks in stabilizing asset prices has arisen from the contributions of Gertler (1999, 2001) , where …nancial frictions give rise to a …nancial accelerator mechanism that magni…es the e¤ects of both exogenous and policy shocks. In their sticky price framework a shock to asset prices increases aggregate demand, hence driving up the price level. Gertler (1999, 2001 ) conclude that there is no need for a direct response to asset prices, as a central bank that responds to general price in ‡ation is implicitly responding to asset price movements. They argue in favor of a monetary policy that does not respond to asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected in ‡ation. Bullard and Schaling (2002) show that adding equity prices to the Taylor rule generally does not improve the economic performance, and might possibly harm both real and …nancial stability. 1 Conversely, Genberg, Lipsky, Cecchetti, and Wadhwani (2000) follow the modelling strategy of Gertler (1999, 2001) , and argue that central banks should respond to asset prices to stabilize the economy and to prevent from the rise of bubbles. 2 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) emphasize the link between pro…tability and output gap in a sticky price environment. They show how a central bank trying to avoid bubbles can inadvertently introduce non-fundamental movements into both asset prices and real activity by reacting to asset prices misalignments. It is a wellestablished fact that in sticky price models marginal costs are proportional to the output gap.
An interest rate rule that responds positively to (expected or current) values of stock prices is a rule that responds positively to dividends. This creates a potential problem from the perspective of equilibrium determinacy. Nisticò (2006) and Airaudo, Nisticò, and Zanna (2006) analyze the role of stock prices for monetary policy design in a small structural model with stock-wealth e¤ects. They …nd that adopting an instrument rule that responds to the stockprice gap incurs risks of endogenous instability that depend on the average price markup in the economy, while reacting to the stock-price growth can achieve substantial stability gains. Faia and Monacelli (2007) study optimal Taylor-type interest rate rules in an economy with credit market imperfections. In their sticky price framework, a countercyclical premium on external …nance is generated through a bankruptcy mechanism. They …nd that monetary policy should lower interest rates in the face of positive misalignments of asset prices from their equilibrium level. Nevertheless, when the monetary authority is strenuously committed to stabilize in ‡ation, responding to asset prices does not bring any bene…t from a welfare point of view. Gilchrist and Saito (2006) reinforce previous results that a policy responding strongly to in ‡ation, in absence of …nancial frictions, is su¢ cient. Adding asset prices to the set of intermediate targets does not lead to further bene…ts. Yet, none of these studies considers the opportunity of responding 1 Nevertheless, they implement an arbitrage condition where the dividend process is not modelled as a function of the pro…ts.
2 Bernanke and Gertler (2001) comment on these results claiming that, although the models used are similar, Genberg, Lipsky, Cecchetti, and Wadhwani (2000) assume that the policymaker knows with certainty the stock price process and, most importantly, when the bubble is going to burst. to asset prices misalignments when capital market imperfections, in the form of a cost channel, are explicitly taken into account. As a matter of fact, most of the studies that argue against an explicit response to asset prices misalignments, generally disregard the importance of the joint direct e¤ect of the cost of working capital on …rms' pricing process and on their pro…tability.
They mainly focus on the role of wealth e¤ects channeled through the demand side.
The Model
2.1. Demand Side. The model economy is populated by households, …rms, and …nancial intermediaries operating on the markets for consumption goods, labor, assets and bonds. The goods market is characterized by monopolistic competition, and the adjustment of prices follows the standard treatment based on Calvo (1983) . Derivations of the basic NK model can be found in Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2003) . Preferences of the representative household are de…ned over a composite consumption good, C t and leisure, 1 N t . Households maximize the expected present discounted value of their utility:
where is the intertemporal discount factor and H t = exp(h t ) is a taste shock. 3 Parameter denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, while is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between work and leisure. Consumption, C t , is a Dixit-Stiglitz bundle composed of a continuum of di¤erentiated goods:
where C jt is the consumption of the good produced by …rm j. Following Steinsson (2003) , Ireland (2004) and Airaudo, Nisticò, and Zanna (2006) , we assume that the elasticity of substitution in demand ( t ) follows a log-stationary stochastic process. This translates into a cost-push shock, which raises a non-trivial trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output gap stabilization (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999 , Result 1 ). Given prices P jt for the j th good, households' demand for good j and the aggregate price index P t read as follows: 
The intertemporal budget constraint can be speci…ed as:
Thus, optimization conditions include the following:
where t denotes the rate of in ‡ation. Equilibrium in the goods market requires Y t = C t .
Furthermore, equations (8) and (9) imply the usual no-arbitrage condition:
2.2. Supply Side. Following the literature on staggered pricing, we adopt the Calvo (1983) speci…cation for the price setting mechanism. The probability that a …rm optimally adjusts its price each period is 1 !. A remaining fraction ! of …rms does not optimally adjust, but simply updates the previous price according to an indexation rule. If a …rm sets its price at time t, it will do so to maximize expected pro…ts, subject to the demand function and a constant return to scale (CRS) production technology Y jt = Z t N jt , where Y jt denotes output and Z t is a stochastic aggregate productivity factor. Following Ravenna and Walsh (2006) , …rm j borrows an amount W t N jt from intermediaries at the gross nominal interest rate R l t : It is assumed that …rms are completely rationed on the equity market. If internally generated funds are not enough to …nance investment, a …nancial gap arises that can only be …lled by resorting to the credit market. Although …rms could in principle issue new equity, this option is a priori ruled out, due to the possibility that new equity issues would be subject to adverse selection phenomena (see Myers and Majluf, 1984) , resulting as too costly to …rms. At a given share price, only overvalued …rms are willing to sell their shares. As potential shareholders anticipate this fact, no trade occurs on the equity market. Under these conditions, the announcement of an equity issue is generally interpreted as bad news by investors and, in extreme situations, the stock market becomes a typical market for lemons. 4 The cost minimization problem is speci…ed as follows:
The real marginal cost is:
where S t equals Wt Zt .
2.3. The Financial Intermediary. We assume that …nancial intermediaries receive deposits M d t from households and a cash injection X t (= M t+1 M t ) from the monetary authority. Contextually, they supply loans L t to …rms at the gross nominal interest rate R l t . At the end of each period, deposits M d t together with the interest i d t M d t are repaid to households. We assume that households are neither capable of monitoring the activity of entrepreneurs nor enforcing …nancial contracts. In this scenario, …nancial intermediation is required. Intermediaries operate costlessly in a competitive environment, so nominal pro…ts in the intermediary industry are:
where the following condition holds regarding resources available for lending:
Following Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and Schabert (2006), we allow for the introduction of varying degrees of interest rate changes to a¤ect …rms' lending costs. As our predecessors, rather than introducing an explicit microfoundation, we assume for simplicity that this friction can be measured by a function t , which depends on the current risk-free interest rate, (R t ).
Log-linearization leads to:
where (= R R= ) denotes the elasticity of the contractual interest rate to percentage changes in the policy rate. A negative value for indicates that a change in the risk-free interest rate is not completely passed through to the lending rate, which can be rationalized by loan price rigidities (see e.g., Hannan and Berger, 1991) . Under these circumstances the cost channel is mitigated. When is positive, a rise in b R t is even accelerated, such that the lending rate rises by more than one-to-one. This can be viewed as a reduced form relation based on …nancial market imperfections due to asymmetric information as accentuated in the literature on the …nancial accelerator (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999) . This parameterization turns out to be quite convenient to assess di¤erent dynamics and policy outcomes. Moreover, empirical results support its adoption: Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and Schabert (2006) estimate an elasticity of 0.28 for Japan and 0.32 for the United States, whereas equals -0.45 and -0.04 in France and Germany, respectively.
2.4. Log-Linear System. The dynamic system describing the economy under scrutiny can be linearized, so that each variable is reported in terms of log-deviation from its ‡exible-price equilibrium counterpart. For simplicity of exposition, in the remainder of the paper, the following notation applies:
From equations (9) and (10) we derive the following relations describing the evolution of the output gap and the deviation of the stock price from its ‡exible-price counterpart:
We assume that …rms fully transfer pro…ts in the form of dividends to the stockholders. Therefore, we impose the following aggregate resource constraint:
It is straightforward to show that the following set of variables under ‡exible prices can be de…ned in terms of percentage deviation from their steady state level:
where g t = 1 h h t . Thus dividends can be transformed in terms of log-deviation from their frictionless counterpart:
where the following notation applies:
Plugging (21) into (16) we get:
where:
Notice that an increase in the equilibrium level of the elasticity of substitution ( ) has a twofold detrimental e¤ect on the asset price gap: (i) via the output gap (y t ) and (ii) via the interest rate (r t ). The latter is substantially ampli…ed in the presence of strong distortions in the credit market ( 0). 5
With regard to the supply-side block, optimization of the discounted ‡ow of future pro…ts under Calvo pricing and log-linearization enables us to obtain the following augmented in ‡ation-adjustment equation (see Galì and Gertler, 1999; Sbordone, 2002) , which now accounts for the cost channel e¤ect:
where
We also assume that the shocks have a stationary autoregressive representation: 
Transmission Mechanism in a Frictionless Economy
We turn our attention to the transmission mechanism in a frictionless economy. Under these circumstances, the interest rate consistent with the ‡exible-price allocation is what Woodford (2003) refers to as the Wicksellian natural rate of interest (henceforth b R f t ). Moreover, this interest rate is compatible with full price stability ( t = 0) when we rule out the short run trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output variability. 6 To determine b R f t , we consider the linear stochastic system composed of equations (17) and (18). Therefore, we can obtain the following solution for the natural rate of interest:
Not surprisingly, the frictionless rate of interest increases in response to a shock to the degree of impatience, while it decreases in response to a shock to productivity. Moreover, as shown in (25), technological perturbations exert a positive e¤ect on the frictionless stock market capitalization. As to the reaction to h t , the sign and the magnitude of the coe¢ cient measuring the response appears to be steadily negative across all plausible parameterizations. By plugging (24) into (20) we can determine the frictionless level of stock market capitalization:
The e¤ect of the taste shock on b q f t o¤ers some interesting insights. In particular, two competing e¤ects can be identi…ed. A positive e¤ect is channeled via the dividend process, while a negative e¤ect comes via the no-arbitrage condition against the riskless rate of return.
It turns out that when the cost channel does not matter, the overall e¤ect is negative for close to 1.
It is useful to compare the e¤ect induced by the cost channel within a frictionless environment with respect to a situation with no supply-side e¤ects. Equations (26) and (27) ) under the hypothesis that the cost channel is ruled out (see also Woodford, 1999) :
Analogously, we can determine the asset price in the absence of cost channel and cost-push shock:
When the cost channel is absent, the response to both sources of exogenous perturbation is lower, in absolute value. Moreover, the di¤erence in magnitude of the reaction coe¢ cients under the two scenarios critically depends on the degree of inertia of the shocks. The following remark formalizes the comparison between the reaction to a technological shock for both the stock price and the rate of interest.
Remark 1. In a frictionless environment, the asset price response to a technological innovation has a greater magnitude when the cost channel matters, compared to a situation in which …rms …nance their production cost merely through internally generated funds. Analogous conclusions can be advanced for the frictionless rate of interest. Therefore, the following properties hold:
Along the lines traced by the literature on …nancial fragility (see, e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 and Gilchrist, 1999) , the existence of a cost-side e¤ect exerts a nonnegligible in ‡uence on the ampli…cation of exogenous shocks, also in a frictionless environment.
Moreover, as detailed by Woodford (1999) , the more temporary the shock the higher the ampli…cation in the face of an innovation to technology or to the degree of impatience. Nevertheless, we can point out that the e¤ect brought by the degree of inertia of an exogenous perturbation is even stronger in the presence of the cost channel. There is no clear-cut evidence about the response of the asset price to the taste shock under the two scenarios, although for a wide range of parameterizations a greater ampli…cation e¤ect is detected under the cost channel.
Determinacy and E-stability Under Benchmark Interest Rate Rules
This section is devoted to the analysis of the dynamic properties of the system summarized in equations (15), (16) and (23). To tackle the problem of REE uniqueness and E-stability (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001 ), we implement two instrumental Taylor-type rules that are extensively used in the literature. As in Bullard and Mitra (2002) , we …rst consider a contemporaneous data-based rule, then we turn our attention to the performance of a forecastbased policy function.
It is well known that determinacy is attained under the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) conditions. Let us assume the following state space form after implementing a speci…c interest rate rule:
and $ t is a vector of shocks. In our case, in the absence of any inertial e¤ect in the model economy and in the policy reaction functions under scrutiny, REE uniqueness is simply achieved if the matrix 1 has real parts of eigenvalues lying inside the unit circle. It is important to recall that we deal with a 3 3 system. Therefore, a third degree characteristic polynomial, denoted by z( ), is retrievable from the matrix under scrutiny, where represents a generic eigenvalue. Under these circumstances, a necessary condition for determinacy is:
For condition (28) to be also su¢ cient, we need the in ‡ection point of the curve associated with the polynomial to lie within the interval [ 1; 1].
As to E-stability, the minimum state variable (MSV) solution takes the following form:
Agents are assumed to form expectations by relying on the perceived law of motion (PLM),
Consequently, the actual law of motion (ALM) reads as follows:
The T -mapping from the PLM to the ALM is:
The MSV-REE is:
According to Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , the MSV-REE is E-stable when the following matrix, evaluated at the REE, has eigenvalues with real parts less than 1:
For the MSV-REE to be E-stable, all roots of matrix J need to have negative real parts. From the Routh Theorem (see Gandolfo, 1996) all roots of J have negative real parts if and only if the following three conditions hold:
where S 2 (J) is the sum of the 2 2 principal minors of J.
In the remainder of the paper, we study determinacy and E-stability conditions under two benchmark policy reaction functions. Given the dimension of our system, the analysis is partly based on the evidence retrievable from simulation exercises. The calibrated values for and turn out to be crucial for pursuing a numerical exploration. In the remainder of the paper we alternatively consider the parameterizations suggested by Woodford (1999) Moreover we assume that = 0:99, = 2 and = 3, if not stated otherwise. 
To analyze determinacy and stability under learning, we write the system in state space form: To ensure equilibrium uniqueness and stability under adaptive learning, we need to verify that the conditions reported are ful…lled. Retrieving analytical conditions for a 3 3 system loses much of the usual appeal in terms of the power to draw clear conclusions. We …nd more intuitive to plot the regions of determinacy and E-stability through a numerical simulation of the model over a wide parameter sub-space for the policy rule's coe¢ cients.
Nonetheless, we …nd that some appealing analytical results can be provided by considering a rule responding only to the rate of in ‡ation. The resulting conditions retain considerable importance for those monetary authorities exclusively or primarily concerned with in ‡ation stabilization. Brückner and Schabert (2003) and Llosa and Tuesta (2007) show that the cost channel modi…es the standard conditions for determinacy and learnability when the central bank operates with either instrument or target rules. Their analysis is based on a NK model featuring a cost channel à la Ravenna and Walsh (2006) . This is to say that the degree of passthrough from policy to bank lending rates can either take value 1 (no cost channel) or 0 (cost channel with perfect pass-through). The following proposition shows that traditional conditions for determinacy and E-stability are further a¤ected when the whole spectrum of values for the pass-through parameter is considered. It turns out that, when the central bank sets the policy instrument in response to the rate of in ‡ation, the width of the region of determinacy dramatically depends on the level of pass-through. Under these circumstances, it is extremely important to assess the magnitude of the cost channel e¤ect.
Proposition 2. Under a contemporaneous data interest rate rule responding to the rate of in ‡ation, the following conditions ensuring equilibrium uniqueness can be identi…ed:
I¤ > 2 :
I¤ < 2 :
Proof. See Appendix A. To attain stability under adaptive learning, we need to check that the eigenvalues of J c33 I are negative. It can be easily shown that the su¢ cient and necessary conditions require both C c > 0 and D c > 0 in the characteristic polynomial retrievable from J c33 I:
Conditions for E-stability are fully nested in those for determinacy. Moreover, the following corollary provides a series of response intervals to contemporaneous in ‡ation that ensure equilibrium uniqueness and E-stability, by taking into consideration the degree of pass-through from the o¢ cial rate to the credit market interest rate.
Corollary 3. The set of conditions stated in the proposition above allows us to determine an interval for critical values of the pass-through:
1. I¤ < 2 the system will always be determinate if > 1.
I¤ 2 <
(1 )+( 1 + +3 +1) +4 + the response coe¢ cient to in ‡ation has to lie within the area between the locus e and the bottom limit represented by = 1;
I¤
(1 )+( 1 + +3 +1) +4 + < + (1 ) the response coe¢ cient to in ‡ation has to lie within the area between the locus b and the bottom limit represented by = 1;
4. I¤ + (1 ) determinacy is never attained.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Conditions reported in Corollary 3 underline the importance of assessing the degree of passthrough when setting up the response coe¢ cient to contemporaneous in ‡ation. We perform a series of numerical exercises to explore the conditions for determinacy and E-stability under the Taylor rule expressed in (29). Therefore, we consider a monetary authority that not only responds to the rate of in ‡ation, but also to output gap and asset prices misalignments. We rely on the set of calibrated parameters proposed by Woodford (1999) and McCallum and Nelson (1999) . Results from the MN parameterization are reported in the main text, whereas those obtained under the Woodford (1999) calibration are reported in Appendix B. 7 We perform each numerical exercise under three di¤erent values of the pass-through parameter ( = f 1; 0; 0:5g).
Thus, we can readily observe the e¤ect induced by an increasing importance of the cost channel e¤ect. In line with Bullard and Mitra (2002) , the autoregressive coe¢ cients of the structural shocks are set to produce log-stationary perturbations.
Moreover, the red-pink (darker) area denotes the space of indeterminacy and E-instability, In the second round of simulations we determine conditions for determinacy and E-stability in the f ; y g space. In the …rst exercise (Figure 2 ) we set q = 0, whereas in the second exercise ( Figure 3 ) we impose q = 0:5. Figure 2a plots the combinations of f ; y g ensuring determinacy and E-stability when the cost channel is ruled out ( = 1). The resulting conditions can be summarized in the well known Taylor principle. Figures 2a and 2b show that, as the degree of pass-through increases, the Taylor principle is no longer su¢ cient to guarantee determinacy. Turning the attention to the combinations ensuring equilibrium uniqueness in the presence of a cost channel e¤ect with perfect pass-through, it is evident how the area of indeterminacy enlarges, as it shifts up on the axis and decreases in y . Given that the nominal rate of interest has a direct e¤ect on the rate of in ‡ation via bank lending, a higher degree of reactiveness is required to avoid non-fundamental ‡uctuations in output and in ‡ation.
For a higher degree of pass-through ( = 0:5), which re ‡ects strong credit market distortions, we can better appreciate the intuition behind Corollary 3. In this case, responding only to in ‡ation might not ensure equilibrium uniqueness. In fact, Figure 2c shows that a region of indeterminacy arises along the axis, whenever the central bank does not react to the output gap or when it reacts too weakly y u 0 . As to stability under learning, for = 0:9 the area denoting E-unstable equilibria shrinks as both q and y increase, whereas it enlarges as the degree of distortion increases. This result is robust across di¤erent calibrations. Nonetheless, a maximum threshold on can be identi…ed, which preserves these qualitative results. Simulations show that this limit can be placed at about 0:98, ceteris paribus. 8 Therefore, our results are quite robust even under a strong degree of persistence in exogenous perturbations. Figure 5 suggests that the central bank should never react too strongly to asset prices misalignments. The maximum threshold ensuring both determinacy and E-stability is always higher for y rather than q . Nevertheless, if we repeat the same exercise under a higher (e.g. = 3 in Figure 5c ) an area of indeterminacy will be detectable in correspondence of low values of both coe¢ cients. In this case, we would observe that an approximately four times lower q is required to drive the system into the area of determinacy, compared to the necessary y . This is even more evident under a forward looking rule.
Determinacy and E-Stability Region (a)
Determinacy and E-Stability Region (a) 4.2. Forward Looking Expectational Rule. Next, we consider a forward looking rule where the monetary authority reacts to future expected in ‡ation, output gap and asset prices misalignments:
The model in state space form can be written as: Again, to assess the e¤ects brought by the cost channel in terms of REE uniqueness and learnability, we …nd intuitive to study the system under a rule responding only to expected in ‡ation. The following proposition shows that traditional conditions for determinacy and Estability are further altered when di¤erent degrees of distortion a¤ect the credit market.
Proposition 4.
Under an interest rate rule responding only to expected in ‡ation in the presence of a cost channel, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing determinacy can be stated as follows:
It can be shown that the conditions ensuring E-stability are fully encompassed by those guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness. Moreover, the following corollary identi…es the range of responses to expected in ‡ation ensuring equilibrium uniqueness and E-stability, depending on the degree of pass-through from the o¢ cial rate to the credit market interest rate.
Corollary 5. The set of conditions stated in the proposition above allows us to determine an interval for critical values of the pass-through:
1 the response coe¢ cient to in ‡ation has to lie within the area between the locus e and the bottom limit represented by = 1.
I¤
(1 )( + ) 4 + ( + ) 1 < < 1 the response coe¢ cient has to be lie within the area between the locus b and the bottom limit represented by = 1.
1 determinacy is never attained.
Determinacy Conditions reported in Corollary 5 point out the importance of considering the degree of pass-through when setting up the response coe¢ cient to the expected future in ‡ation. Figure 6 shows the dynamic properties of the system in the f ; g space. If the central bank reacts only to the rate of in ‡ation, a unique REE can be obtained only for low values of the pass-through.
As detailed in Corollary 5, the monetary authority has to avoid a strong reaction to in ‡ation as this might shift the system into the area of indeterminacy. 9
Figures 7b and 7c show that the system delivers an indeterminate outcome in the presence of the cost channel, over the whole spectrum of , when the central bank does not respond either to expected assets prices misalignments or to output gap. Moreover, to rule out indeterminacy the response coe¢ cient to the expected output gap has to increase in the degree of pass-through.
Determinacy and E-Stability Region (a) Simulations reported in Figure 7 also con…rm the basic results observed in Figure 6 . Under large distortions ( > 0), as those re ‡ected in Figure 7c , the central bank has to respond quite strongly to the output gap and to make sure that its reaction to in ‡ation is not too strong, as this would lead to an indeterminate outcome. Again, the area of E-instability enlarges as increases (see Figures 7 and 8 ).
Determinacy and E-Stability Region (a) As shown in Figure 9 , a greater response to asset price misalignments q = 0:5 would almost completely remove the area of instability arising at low values of y . Nonetheless, the minimum response to in ‡ation has to be stronger, compared to the previous exercise. Interestingly, we can observe that the E-instability area decreases considerably as the response coe¢ cient q increases. The area of E-instability increases in the degree of pass-through , ceteris paribus. These results are robust across di¤erent calibrations.
To con…rm the results from previous simulations, we also report determinacy conditions in the q ; space for y = 0 (Figure 10 ), while Figure 11 reports the area of determinacy in the q ; y space for = 2. Figure 10 shows that a higher response to asset prices has to be accompanied by a higher response to in ‡ation to ensure equilibrium uniqueness. Moreover, Figure 11 shows that the area of determinacy signi…cantly narrows down as the degree of passthrough increases and re ‡ects a highly distortive allocation mechanism in the credit market.
Ceteris paribus ( = 2 and = 0:5), the value of q required to shift the system into the area of determinacy is twice as small as the necessary y , although the range of responses ensuring determinacy is higher in the second case.
Determinacy and E-Stability Region (a) The analysis of the conditions for equilibrium uniqueness o¤ers an interesting picture. It turns out that even a low response to asset prices misalignments helps at ruling out the area of indeterminacy that arises if the monetary authority reacts only to the rate of in ‡ation. Overall, a joint response to both E t q t+1 and E t y t+1 generally leads to a wider area of determinacy. The central bank achieves greater bene…ts from the implementation of a rule featuring a relatively lower response to the expected output gap. Otherwise, if the monetary authority does not respond to asset prices misalignments, then it should attach a signi…cantly stronger response to E t y t+1 . It is interesting to point out that, under the Woodford (1999) calibration (Appendix B), the area of determinacy is much wider when the central bank responds to asset prices rather than to the output gap. Simulations under this set of parameters con…rm the importance of reacting to either asset prices or output gap in the presence of strong credit market distortions.
4.3. Discussion. As our analytical and numerical results show, standard conditions for determinacy and E-stability are modi…ed when the cost channel matters. We show that responding to asset prices misalignments in the presence of strong distortions a¤ecting the credit market allows the central bank to restore REE uniqueness and E-stability. This is particularly evident when the monetary authority implements a forward looking rule (33), as the system is more sensitive to changes in the degree of pass-through. In this case, even a weak cost channel e¤ect introduces signi…cant changes in the conditions for determinacy and E-stability. In fact, under a contemporaneous data rule, a higher is necessary to observe a spike of indeterminacy for low values of the response coe¢ cient attached to the output gap. This is to say that, especially under uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the cost channel e¤ect, a monetary authority is better o¤ by responding to current rather than to forecast data. This strategy generally allows the central bank to face a wider area of determinacy.
In standard NK frameworks with no capital market imperfections, dividends are negatively related to the output gap. As marginal costs are proportional to the output gap, an interest rate rule that responds positively to (expected or current) stock price deviations from their frictionless level is a rule that responds positively to …rms'pro…tability. This amounts to say that the central bank responds negatively to the underlying distortion-the marginal cost. This is exactly the opposite of what should be done to achieve stabilization. When a cost channel e¤ect is at work, this mechanism no longer holds. This is especially evident for high values of the pass-through, which re ‡ect a distortive allocation mechanism in the credit market. In this case, the monetary instrument a¤ects positively marginal costs, hence a monetary innovation exerts a direct in ‡uence on in ‡ation dynamics in the same direction. At the same time, in ‡ationary pressures are scaled down if the central bank responds positively to asset prices, as this re ‡ects a negative response to the output gap that balances the cost channel e¤ect in the NK curve.
This mechanism is at the root of the gain in determinacy when we consider a positive response to current or expected asset prices misalignments. Therefore, if the cost channel matters, we draw opposite policy prescriptions with respect to those advanced by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) in their baseline framework. As a matter of fact, they assert that one shortcoming of the benchmark model is that in response to a monetary contraction, marginal cost falls so sharply that pro…ts actually rise. 10 Our model abstracts from this criticism, as pro…tability is directly a¤ected by the nominal interest rate via a cost channel e¤ect.
Welfare Analysis
We shift our focus on the welfare implications of the two benchmark rules under scrutiny. In line with Orphanides and Williams (2007) , we analyze the loss incurred by the monetary authority under di¤erent stabilization objectives. The following loss speci…cations are considered:
Calibration of the coe¢ cients in the loss function is still an open issue in the literature. Notice that usually the coe¢ cient attached to in ‡ation is normalized to 1. According to Orphanides and Williams (2006) , the coe¢ cient attached to the output gap is set to 4, in line with Okun's law. This implies equal weights to the rate of in ‡ation and the output gap in the loss function.
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Orphanides and Williams (2006) also consider a benchmark calibration ' r = 1. In the remainder of the paper, we will set ' q = 4. However, our qualitative results are not a¤ected if we consider smaller values for the relative weight attached to the interest rate smoothing term. Overall, our results are quite robust across di¤erent calibrations of the coe¢ cients characterizing the relative importance of competing welfare objectives.
A word of caution is in order at this stage. In a standard NK setting it is possible to provide microfoundations for a loss function that balances in ‡ation and output gap variability through a second order approximation (see Woodford, 2003) . Conversely, in the present framework there is no direct analytical rationale for the introduction of a term penalizing stock price ‡uctuations
[as in (39) and (40)]. The purpose of this exercise is to assess the desirability to react to asset price ‡uctuations in the presence of a cost channel e¤ect.
In the remainder of this section numerical results are presented just under loss speci…cations (a) q = 0 and (b) q = 0:1 1 1 Notice that the contour maps are plotted only in correspondence with the space of determinacy. 1 2 Notice that, as in the graphical inspection, we consider a maximum response of 4 in the ; y space. Therefore, the concept of minimum loss has to be regarded with respect to the space considered.
1 3 Available on line at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/phd/es356/research.html. Moreover, numerical analysis suggests that, in the presence of any institutional or operational reason to be concerned with asset prices variability, then the central bank is better o¤ by responding to asset prices misalignments. We can observe that loss under both speci…cations (37) and (40) increases in the degree of pass-through. Reacting to asset prices misalignments determines an increase in the overall volatility, at every value of the pass-through. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the asset price volatility term into the loss function determines a marked increase in the overall welfare loss.
This can be ascribed to the presence of excess volatility in asset prices misalignments, compared to in ‡ation and output gap. Excess volatility is an inherent feature of asset prices and it is often advanced as a rationale for avoiding an explicit response to them (see, e.g., Bullard and Schaling, 2002) . In addition, our numerical exercises con…rm that it is bene…cial to react to asset prices misalignments when the loss function incorporates a term re ‡ecting their volatility, for both Taylor-type rules and for both criteria of welfare loss evaluation.
The minimum possible loss is generally lower under a forward looking rule than under a contemporaneous data reaction function. However, the minimum loss with a forward looking rule under (37) is often achieved at "implausibly" high responses to output gap. The advantage of the forward looking rule over the contemporaneous rule in terms of minimum loss tends to vanish as the degree of pass-through increases. Therefore, we …nd quite informative to assess the loss under a more plausible parameterization, such as = 1:5; y = 0:5 . In this case, we can notice that a contemporaneous data rule produces a lower loss, both under (37) and (40).
Moreover, as to the combination of ; y ensuring the minimum loss, a strong reaction to in ‡ation is generally required under (37), while y is lower and decreases in the degree of passthrough. Intuitively, as the pass-through parameter increases, re ‡ecting a …nancial accelerator e¤ect via the banking sector, the volatilities of in ‡ation, asset prices and output gap rise. We …nd that output gap variability has a relatively small response to changes in , compared to that of in ‡ation and asset prices. 14 This e¤ect is even more evident under (40). When the loss function incorporates a term re ‡ecting asset prices volatility, the monetary authority needs a relatively higher q . In this case, also the response to in ‡ation must be minimal, as asset prices volatility accounts for the majority of the welfare loss. In addition, further numerical analysis shows that asset prices volatility increases in and y .
Concluding Remarks
We develop a New Keynesian macroeconomic model to study the interplay between capital market imperfections, …rm pro…tability and in ‡ation dynamics. We rely on a sticky price framework featuring a cost-side e¤ect along the lines traced by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) .
We extend the baseline model in two main directions: …rst, following Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and Schabert (2006), we allow for the introduction of varying degrees of interest rate changes to a¤ect …rms'costs of lending; second, we consider the direct in ‡uence of credit market distortions on …rm pro…tability and, in turn, stock price dynamics. We provide an analytical treatment of the conditions ensuring REE uniqueness and E-stability when the monetary authority reacts only to in ‡ation. Standard conditions turn out to be signi…cantly di¤erent in the presence of strong credit market distortions.
Numerical simulations allow us to study the performance of interest rate rules reacting to the current (or expected) output gap, in ‡ation and asset prices misalignments. Moreover, we assess the loss of welfare incurred by the monetary authority in the presence of di¤erent degrees of the pass-through between the policy instrument and bank lending rates under di¤erent Taylortype rules. Our analysis shows that considering a one-to-one relationship between policy rates and bank lending rates, as assumed in Ravenna and Walsh (2006) , can be quite misleading for the sake of designing a rule that ensures REE determinacy and stability under adaptive learning when the cost channel matters. We show that in conditions of uncertainty regarding the degree of pass-through between policy and bank lending rates, the central bank is generally better o¤ following a rule in which the policy instrument is set according to misalignments in contemporaneous data rather than adopting an expectational interest rate rule. Moreover, in the former case, a considerably wider area of determinacy can be achieved. In addition, for a plausible range of responses to in ‡ation and output gap the adoption of a contemporaneous data rule ensures, on average, a lower welfare loss.
When the cost channel matters, the risk of indeterminacy and instability under adaptive learning can be reduced if the central bank reacts positively to actual (or expected) asset prices misalignments from their frictionless values or to current (or expected) output gap. It can often be argued that a response to asset prices might be even more desirable than a response to the output gap to ensure determinacy. This is the case when monetary policy is conducted in environments characterized by strong credit market distortions. In principle, this strategy has a negative e¤ect on …rms'pro…tability and raises the risk of in ‡ationary pressures. Nevertheless, as in a sticky price framework …rms'pro…tability is negatively related to the output gap, in ‡ationary pressures brought by the cost channel e¤ect can be smoothed down if the central bank responds positively to asset prices misalignments. Therefore, a positive response to out-ofequilibrium dynamics in asset prices balances the negative impact brought by the cost channel on in ‡ation dynamics, especially in the presence of a strong pass-through from policy to bank lending rates. These results contradict the policy prescriptions achieved by previous studies exploring the role of monetary policy as a potential …nancial stabilizer. Most importantly, our …ndings highlight the need to carefully assess the degree of credit market distortions to draw sound prescriptions for monetary policy design.
Future work appears desirable in several areas. In a companion paper, we explore the implications of the cost channel for the design of optimal monetary policy, assuming that the central bank is faced with a loss function that balances asset price variability along with output and in ‡ation. We also aim at exploring further the nature of the E-stable equilibria in the area of indeterminacy, in order to assess the conditions for sunspots learnability and their policy implications. More generally, we argue that it is important to further explore the informational content of asset prices for the conduct of monetary policy.
Appendix A

Steady State Values
Proposition 2 Proof.
If we set q = 0 in (29), the discount factor turns out to be one of the three eigenvalues of the matrix 1 c c . Under these settings, the NK Phillips curve and the IS curve constitute an autonomous system, where the matrix of structural parameters associated to the forward looking vector is the following cofactor:
This setup implies that the necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing determinacy can be stated as follows:
where A c and B c are the coe¢ cients of the characteristic polynomial retrievable from J c33 :
Assuming that y = 0 we obtain:
Let us focus …rst on condition (41):
which translates into:
We take into consideration the …rst inequality (43). We have to multiply both sides by its denominator. On the one hand, this factor is always be positive for < (su¢ cient condition).
On the other hand, when > , we need to introduce a restriction on in order to ensure its positiveness.
Condition 1: In order to rule out the possibility that the term + ( ) is negative, we have to assume that i¤ > the following restriction must apply:
Notice that this condition holds across di¤erent plausible parameterizations and it is always satis…ed by the three sets of calibrated parameters taken into consideration in the present work.
After these premises, we can rearrange (43):
In order to derive a condition for the response coe¢ cient we have to divide the inequality by ( ) on both sides. This term is negative when > . In this case we end up with the following condition:
In the opposite case, when < , we get:
Note that the term on the LHS of (46) is always negative. Let us consider condition (44):
Again, in order to isolate on the RHS we have to divide both sides of the inequality by ( ). Thus, i¤ > , we get:
When > the term
) is always positive under the restriction characterizing the baseline parameterization. In the opposite case when < we get:
As this threshold is always be negative, condition (48) is fully nested in > 1. Thus we do not have to consider it.
Let us turn the attention to the second condition for determinacy, namely (42). This leads to the following inequalities:
(1 + ) (1 + ) ( + ) + ( )
(1 + ) (1 + ) ( + )
We …rst focus on the former. Again, by assuming that Condition 1 holds true we get:
( (1 + 2 ) ) < 2 (1 + ) + ( + ) :
Thus we have to consider the sign of the term ( (1 + 2 ) ). This turns out to be always positive i¤ < (su¢ cient condition). Nevertheless, we the following condition has also to be considered:
> 2 1 2 = 2 :
As 2 < the following condition is only valid for, > 2 , i¤ 0 < < ( ) :
< 2 (1 + ) + ( + ) ( (1 + 2 ) ) :
Otherwise, when < 2 , we end up with:
But then this expression is always negative and thus it is nested in the Taylor principle, > 1.
Let us consider now (50). By applying the same procedure as in the previous case, we end up with the Taylor principle:
Notice that (46) and (48) identify negative thresholds, hence they are always nested in condition (53). Therefore they are discarded. To sum up:
I¤ > then the relevant conditions are:
( 1) ( ) > ;
( + 1) ( ) > :
As we know that under this assumption that > :
The only binding condition is (45): The following inequality always holds: 2 < . Thus (31) will be binding …rst from the left. For two conditions have to be ful…lled to ensure determinacy. We know that, for > , if we compare conditions (30) and (47) the following inequality always holds:
All we have to do now is to compute the value of where conditions (30) and (31) We now have to compute the last threshold for the pass-through parameter above which determinacy is never attained. This occurs at b = = 1. Straightforward computation shows that:
Proposition 4 Proof. As the central bank does respond nor to asset prices misalignments neither to output gap, is one of the three eigenvalues of J f . Furthermore the NK Phillips curve and the IS constitute an autonomous system where the matrix of structural parameters associated to the forward looking vector is represented by the following cofactor:
Under a forward looking interest rate rule the necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing determinacy can be stated as follows:
where A f and B f are the coe¢ cients of the characteristic polynomial associated to J f 33 :
where A f = ( 1) ( + ) ( + 1) 1
Let us focus …rst on condition (54):
j + ( + 1)j < 1; which translates into:
( + 1) < 1:
Let us consider …rst condition (56). This inequality can be written as:
Let us consider then condition (57):
Under > 1 this can be expressed as:
In the remainder we will notice that, being this threshold always negative, (59) is fully encompassed by > 1. Let us now focus on condition (55):
( 1) ( + ) ( + 1) 1 < 1 + + ( + 1) ;
( 1) ( + ) ( + 1) 1 > 1 ( + 1) :
We …rst consider condition (60). After some rearrangements this can be written as:
1 + 2 ( + 1) < 2 + 2 + + :
Now we have to divide each side of then inequality by the term 1 + 2 ( + 1) : This is always be positive for:
If we assume that the condition above holds we can determine the following constraint for the response coe¢ cient:
Otherwise, when > 2 : > 2 + 2 + + 1 + 2 ( + 1) :
Next let's consider condition (61). This leads to:
Notice that the threshold expressed in condition (63) is negative and thus completely nested in (64).
Corollary 5 Proof.
Proposition 4 identi…es three relevant conditions. We …rst have to compute the points where conditions (35) and (36) cross condition (34). It can easily be con…rmed that condition (36) crosses condition (34) at:
and that condition (35) crosses condition (34) at:
Notice that (65) is always less than -1 and lies on the left of (66). Moreover, as (36) is increasing in it will always constitute an upper bound to the maximum from = 1 up to the point where the conditions (35) and (36) cross each other:
It also has to be con…rmed that point (67) is on the left hand side of the asymptote of condition (35), namely 2 . After some tedious algebra it can be proved that this is always the case (under the parameter restrictions outlined). From equal to (67) condition (35) binds
